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Time is Money: Rational Life Cycle Inertia  
and the Delegation of Investment Management 
 
1.  Introduction 
Investor inertia, or the tendency to maintain one’s investment portfolio for long periods of 
time without changing it, has been interpreted as evidence of irrationality or financial illiteracy.1 
In the present paper, by contrast, we incorporate the opportunity cost of time associated with 
investment management and show that such inertia can be consistent with optimal behavior. 
Additionally, we explain why some investors rationally delegate the responsibility to make their 
investment decisions to a financial advisor. To this end, we develop a life cycle model with 
rational agents that generates household portfolio inertia patterns consistent with much empirical 
evidence.2 In a dynamic consumption and portfolio framework with endogenous labor supply, 
we account for time costs devoted to portfolio management. This time becomes particularly 
valuable when the individual has the opportunity to accumulate job-specific human capital via 
learning by doing. Our structure for financial decision making costs also posits an age-related 
time efficiency pattern for financial decision making, in keeping with empirical evidence in 
Agarwal et al. (2009), Gamble et al. (2014), and Horn and Cattell (1967). We also evaluate the 
role of financial advisors who, for a fee, help investors manage their financial portfolios. This 
possibility enables individuals to invest in their job-related human capital and thus to enhance 
lifetime earnings. 
Several prior studies on portfolio choice have shown that people rarely alter their 
financial portfolios. For instance, Bilias et al. (2009) analyzed investor trading behavior in the 
                                                     
1 See Van Rooij, Lusardi, and Alessie 2011; related work includes Lusardi and Mitchell (2014) and Mitchell, 
Mottola, Utkus, and Yamaguchi (2006). 
2 See for instance Bilias et al. (2009), and Brunnermeier and Nagel (2008). 
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Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) and found that most of stock account owners (up to 
70%) exhibited portfolio inertia. They also showed that portfolio inertia followed a U-shaped 
profile over the life cycle because younger workers owned almost no stock, while older persons 
who did have assets traded them infrequently. Ameriks and Zeldes (2004) studied TIAA-CREF 
accountholders over a dozen years, and they noted that 73% of investors never changed their 
asset allocation at all, and another 14% rebalanced only once. Agnew et al. (2003) also reported 
substantial inertia among investors, particularly in their retirement accounts with close to 90% 
never altering their portfolios. Similarly a 2008 survey commissioned by the SEC Office of 
Investor Education and Advocacy (OIEA) asked investors how often they traded stocks, bonds, 
or mutual funds (outside employer-sponsored retirement accounts), and they found that over 70% 
of investors changed their investment allocations at most once a year. In other words, inertia is 
the norm for a wide range of investors.3 
Notwithstanding this evidence, a large body of research on household finance has focused 
on optimal dynamic portfolio allocation patterns selected by rational forward-looking consumers 
who decide on their own how to allocate their wealth between stocks and bonds.4 This approach 
has been extended to include flexible labor supply decisions.5 Building on these prior studies, we 
focus on how the opportunity cost of time devoted to investment management influences 
portfolio choice, in the context of endogenous human capital accumulation. This allows us to 
diagnose reasons for portfolio inertia and the demand for financial advisors over the life cycle.   
                                                     
3 For additional evidence on this point, see Agnew et al. (2003); Ameriks and Zeldes (2004); Bilias et al. (2009); 
Calvet et al. (2009); Choi et al. (2002); Dellavigna and Pollet (2008); the Economist (2011); Madrian and Shea 
(2001); and Tang et al. (2010). Barber and Odean (2000) did find evidence of churning among some account holders 
at a large discount brokerage company in 1996, yet their unusual sample is not characteristic of typical investors.  
4 C.f. Cocco et al. (2005); Gomes and Michaelidis (2003); Horneff et al. (2009); and Cocco and Gomes (2012). 
5 Among these are Bodie, Merton, and Samuelson (1992); Chai et al. (2011); and Gomes et al. (2008). 
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When investors cannot delegate, young and old investors optimally exhibit inertia, while 
middle-aged investors are more active. This is because the young workers have little job-specific 
human capital and have the longest time horizon, so they prefer to invest in work skills and 
exhibit portfolio inertia. Accordingly, they optimally stay out of the stock market and exhibit 
inertia in non-participation. Middle-aged investors with more job-specific human capital have 
lower opportunity costs of financial investment. Newly-retired individuals are more active in 
managing their portfolios because they no longer forego learning on the job, and they must also 
optimally withdraw from their financial accounts before rising inefficiency in portfolio 
management and growing mortality risk set in. Later in retirement, older persons are less 
involved in trading their financial assets, because growing mortality risk and falling decision 
making efficiency render active management costly. Accordingly, different portfolio 
management approaches are optimally chosen over the life cycle depending on the investor’s 
financial and labor market status. We also find that the average equity share of liquid assets is 
hump-shaped with age, consistent with empirical evidence.6 
When households have an opportunity to delegate money management, results are rather 
different. Overall, we see that access to delegation reduces both inertia and active 
self-management. The delegation option is attractive for both young and old investors. 
Approximately one-quarter (25%) of investors younger than age 30, 20% of middle-aged 
investors (age 30-65), and around 40% of retirees now optimally delegate to financial advisors. 
Moreover, access to delegation substantially reduces active management, especially among the 
youngest and oldest investors. Active management is adopted by only a small fraction (less than 
1%) of the youngest and oldest investors, but by many more of the middle-aged (around 30%) 
                                                     
6 See for example Ameriks and Zeldes (2004) and U.S. Census Bureau (2012) 
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and early retirees (~50%). Early retirees are the most active investor group because they have no 
opportunity cost of forgone labor supply and must optimally withdraw from their financial 
accounts to cover consumption. Rather than paying a delegation fee, they instead actively 
manage their finances by withdrawing on their own. Later in life, retirees are more likely to 
delegate and become less active due to increased mortality risk and decision making inefficiency. 
One of our primary research contributions is to model portfolio inertia of individuals who 
have free access to the stock market yet still do not touch their portfolios over long periods of 
time.7 That is, unlike studies on equity market participation (e.g., Gomes and Michaelides 2005; 
Vissing-Jorgensen 2003), we show that, while most individuals (57% in our model) rationally 
elect inertia unconditional on stock ownership, many (47%) of stock investors also elect portfolio 
inertia. In comparative statics analysis, we also evaluate how initial market participation costs 
influence portfolio inertia patterns, and we show such an initial cost need not produce portfolio 
inertia among equity owners.  
To assess welfare gains of having access to a finanical advisor, we compute the change in 
the certainty-equivalent (CE) consumption stream when investors do versus do not have access to 
delegation. Using our baseline fee structure, investors having access to financial advice enjoy 
greater lifetime welfare by the equivalent of a 1.2% improvement in their annual consumption 
streams. We also conduct a sensitivity analysis for different costs of financial advice, to evaluate 
investors’ potential welfare gains from lowering entry barriers to financial advisory services. We 
conclude that eliminating a minimum fee for advisory services would enhance welfare by 1.43%, 
compared to the case where no delegation is available. Overall, lowering the entry barriers to 
                                                     
7 This is consistent with a wide range of empirical findings; see Agnew et al.(2003); Ameriks and Zeldes (2004); 
Brunnermeir and Nagel (2008); Calvet et al. (2009a; 2009b); and Dahlquist and Martinez (2015).  
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access financial advisors can help people of all ages (and particularly the young and the old) to 
better manage their finances and save their scarcest asset, time for accumulating more 
job-specific skills or enjoying leisure. Our findings have implications for research and policy 
regarding investment management and financial advice. 
In what follows, Section 2 describes our specification of the investor’s portfolio problem 
when the primary opportunity cost of financial management is the time that could otherwise be 
used for job-related human capital accumulation. Section 3 describes the dynamic portfolio 
choice problem when invetors have an option to hire financial advisors. Section 4 presents our 
calibration of parameters and approach to numerical solution of the model. Section 5 illustrates 
results of investors’ portfolio choice problems, first without delegation, and then with the option 
of hiring a financial advisor. Section 6 provides sensitivity analysis and evaluates the welfare 
impact of delegation. We conclude with a discussion of implications of our findings for investors, 
the financial advisory industry, retirement plan sponsors, and policymakers. 
 
2.  Dynamic Portfolio Choice with Inertia 
In this section we specify the investor’s problem when allocating his portfolio, on the 
assumption that active management of financial assets requires individuals to devote time to the 
process.  
2.1  Financial Decision Making Efficiency and Time Budgets over the Life Cycle 
We posit a consumer dynamically determining his equity share and labor supply over the 
life cycle, both of which influence his current and future labor income as well as his financial 
wealth. The individual is endowed with a per-period time available (normalized to 1). Before 
retirement, he can allocate his time to work in the paid labor market ሺ݈௧ሻ to generate income, or 
to leisure ሺܮ௧ሻ. His decision period ሺݐ ൌ 0, 1, … , ܶሻ is measured in years; at ݐ ൌ 0 he begins 
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his work life at age 20. He also faces mortality risk over the course of his (uncertain) lifetime, 
with the maximum age (here set to 100, ܶ ൌ 80ሻ. 
An individual who is not a financial expert will need to devote both time and mental 
resources to the task of financial management (Abel et al. 2013; Campbell et al. 2011). This can 
be costly, inasmuch as managing financial assets requires collecting and processing information 
about market conditions (Christelis et al. 2010), analyzing financial products’ risk/return 
characteristics, and evaluating product fee structures (Anagol and Kim 2012). And while there 
may be a one-time initial entry cost of equity participation (Vissing-Jorgensen 2002), it will still 
be necessary each period for investors to expend resources to evaluate changing financial market 
conditions and understand new products (Carlin 2009, Carlin and Manso 2011). This imposes on 
individuals an opportunity cost each period, inasmuch as labor earnings depend on job-specific 
skills derived from work experience.8  
We capture the explicit opportunity cost of adjusting one’s portfolio by the fraction of 
time ሺ߶௧ሻ that is devoted to financial decision making. Someone who is not well-informed 
about financial markets will need to allocate more time to acquire and process information about 
his portfolio. Accordingly, the investor faces the following time budget constraint: 
 ݈௧ ൅ ܮ௧ ൅ ߶௧૚ሼ௔೟ୀଵሽ ൌ 1, (1) 
where ܽ௧ is a variable taking the value of 1 if he actively manages, and 0 otherwise. This time 
constraint implies that the investor can make use of his time to either work or enjoy leisure, if he 
elects not to actively manage his financial portfolio.  
                                                     
8 There is a vast literature on on-the-job skill acquisition; see for instance Arrow (1962), Becker (1964), Lucas 
(1988), and Levitt et al. (2013) among others. Some people may enjoy self-management or believe they can 
outperform the market as well as professional investors, though few actually do so in practice: their performance is 
often worse than average (Barber and Odean 2000, Lusardi and Mitchell 2007, Mitchell et al. 2009). Additionally, 
peoples’ portfolio allocations across mutual funds often produces lower returns due to infrequent rebalancing 
(Frazzini and Lamont 2008).  
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We also posit that the time cost of making an efficient financial decision ߶௧ can vary 
with age. Consistent with the economics and neuroscience literatures on decision making (Horn 
and Cattell 1967; Agarwal et al. 2009), we suppose that middle-aged investors are more efficient 
in managing their wealth than are younger or older individuals. Accordingly, we model the 
age-dependent time cost of financial management as a U-shaped function over the life cycle with 
the highest efficiency (i.e., lowest ߶௧) in middle age.9 This reflects the fact that the young are 
cognitively able but inexperienced in the labor force; also older workers have job experience but 
may have diminished cognitive ability. Middle-aged investors tend to be at their best, having 
gained job experience and not yet experienced cognitive decline. Nevertheless, as investors incur 
time costs period when they manage their financial portfolios actively,10 there is no assumed 
value of experience in financial management (Chiang et al. 2011). 
2.2  The Human Capital Accumulation Process 
We posit that job-specific human capital is accumulated through learning by doing. In 
keeping with Arrow (1962) and Becker (1964), we denote with ܪ௧ and ݈௧, respectively, as the 
time devoted to developing job-specific human capital and work time each period. The law of 
motion for job-specific human capital is: 
 ܪ௧ାଵ ൌ ሾሺ1 െ ߜ௧ሻܪ௧ ൅ ܨ௧ሺܪ௧, ݈௧ሻሿ ൈ ߣ௧, (2) 
where ܨ௧ሺܪ௧, ݈௧ሻ is an experience formulation function and ߜ௧  is a depreciation rate11 for 
job-specific human capital. An idiosyncratic temporary shock (ߣ௧ሻ also affects the accumulation 
level of human capital in the next period. 
                                                     
9 Technically, this inefficiency arises from the complexity that the typical investor faces when implementing his 
choices in a dynamic programming problem; see Johnson et al. (2001).  
10 In our model the agent must re-solve his life cycle model and implement new choices each period, so he incurs 
new time costs every time he engages in active management.  
11 This can also be interpreted as a rate of skill obsolescence; that is, some knowledge becomes outdated by the 
advent of new technology.  
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This formulation makes clear that work in the current period ሺ݈௧ሻ not only generates 
current labor income but also raises the stock of human capital resulting in higher future labor 
income. Previous research on endogenous labor supply in a dynamic portfolio choice model has 
incorporated uncertain wage rates as an important source of risk (Bodie et al. 1992, Gomes et al. 
2008, Chai et al. 2011), but there the decision to work was assumed to affect only current 
income. Since in prior models life cycle wage profiles were assumed to be determined only by 
age and exogenous labor market shocks, those studies implicitly assumed that work time 
substituted for current leisure time, so the price of leisure was simply the current wage. By 
contrast, in what follows, we model investors who know that taking time away from work today 
influences their human capital accumulation and hence future labor earnings. Specifically, we 
specify the experience acquisition function as follows, following Ben-Porath (1967):  
 ܨ௧ሺܪ௧, ݈௧ሻ ൌ ܽሺܪ௧ ൉ ݈௧ሻఏ (3) 
where a is a parameter that represents an individual’s efficiency for accumulating human 
capital.12 The elasticity of human capital accumulation ߠ is assumed to display decreasing 
returns to scale ൫ߠ ∈ ሺ0,1ሻ൯. 
2.3  Labor Income and Asset Returns 
Disposable yearly labor income (ܧ௧) is determined by the individual’s job-specific human 
capital level ሺܪ௧ሻ, wage shock ሺ ௧ܻሻ, and labor supply (݈௧): 
 ܧ௧ ൌ ሺ1 െ ݄௧ሻሺ1 െ ߬௧ሻ݈௧ܪ௧ ௧ܻ ௧ܷ, (4) 
where ݄௧ and τ୲ represent housing expenditures and labor income tax, respectively. The level 
of human capital or job-specific skill ܪ௧ plays a role similar to the age-specific deterministic 
wage trend in the life cycle literature (Cocco et al. 2005, Gomes et al. 2008, Hubener 2013 et 
                                                     
12 Our notion of human capital is informed by job-specific skills accumulated by working, as in Becker (1964). 
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al.).13 In the present case, however, ܪ௧ is endogenously accumulated over time (i.e., learning by 
doing) when the individual works, as per equation (2). The permanent wage shock ሺݕ௧ ≡ log ௧ܻሻ 
follows a random walk process and is influenced by an idiosyncratic shock (Carroll 1997, Cocco 
et al. 2005) ݕ௧ ൌ ݕ௧ିଵ ൅ ߳௧௬where ߳௧௬~݅݅݀	ܰሺ	െ0.5ߪ௬ଶ, ߪ௬ሻ. The transitory wage shock ( ௧ܷ) is 
log normally distributed with ݈݋݃	ሺ ௧ܷሻ~݅݅݀	ܰሺെ0.5ߪ௎ଶ, ߪ௎ሻ . After the (exogenous) age-65 
retirement age (ݐ ൌ 45ሻ, the individual stops working (݈௧ ൌ 0ሻ and receives a lifelong pension 
benefit equal to a fraction of his final labor earnings. 
Two asset classes are available for the consumer’s investment portfolio: riskless bonds 
and risky stocks. Bonds have a constant annual real gross return of ௙ܴ in all periods. The real 
stock gross return ሺܴ௧ௌሻ	is assumed to be serially independent and identically log normally 
distributed with parameters ߤௌ and ߪௌ, implying that logሺܴ௧ௌሻ~	ܰ	ሺߤௌ, ߪௌሻ.14 The correlation 
between the stock log return and the innovation to the permanent wage shock is denoted by ߪఢௌ. 
We denote ܴ௧ାଵௌ  as the stock gross return from time ݐ to ݐ ൅ 1, so that the fraction of the 
individual’s wealth invested in stocks is determined in period ݐ, and returns are realized in ݐ ൅
1. Following Gomes et al. (2003), we consider a proportional rate τେ applied to all asset returns 
the household receives. Therefore the after-tax bond return is given by തܴ ൌ 1 ൅ ሺ ௙ܴ െ 1ሻሺ1 െ
τେሻ and the after-tax stock return is given by ܴ௧ାଵ ൌ 1 ൅ ሺܴ௧ାଵௌ െ 1ሻሺ1 െ τେሻ. 
2.4  Preferences  
As in Gomes et al. (2008), we suppose the investor has a standard time-separable power 
utility function defined over a composite good consisting of current consumption ሺܥ௧ሻ and time 
                                                     
13  Indeed below we estimate the parameters of a human capital accumulation process by matching the 
model-generated moments with that of the age-specific deterministic wage profile in Hubener et al. (2013).  
14 Tang et al. (2010) report that people receive lower returns when they manage their own portfolios, compared to 
having professionals manage them. For simplicity, we assume that equity returns are the same for all portfolio 
management methods (inertia, active management, and delegation). 
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devoted to leisure ሺܮ௧ሻ, which is given in period by ௧ܷሺܥ௧, ܮ௧ሻ ൌ ଵଵିఊ ሺܥ௧ܮ௧ఈሻଵିఊ. Here ߙ	 ൐ 	0 
captures the investor’s preference for leisure relative to consumption. The parameter ߛ measures 
relative risk aversion. 
2.5  Wealth Dynamics and Portfolio Inertia vs. Active Management 
The investor is assumed to have a stock market account and a bond market account.15 In 
each period ݐ, the investor needs to decide how much to consume (ܥ௧) from his available total 
wealth (or cash on hand, ௧ܹ), and how much to invest in the stock market for the next period 
(ܵ௧ ൒ 0). The remaining wealth is invested in bonds (ܤ௧ ൌ ௧ܹ െ ܥ௧ െ ܵ௧). Let ܼ௧ be the balance 
of his stock market account at time ݐ. The dynamic budget constraint and evolution of wealth 
can then be formulated as follows: 
 ௧ܹ ൌ ܥ௧ ൅ ܵ௧ ൅ ܤ௧  (5) 
 ܼ௧ାଵ ൌ ܵ௧ܴ௧ାଵ (6) 
 ௧ܹାଵ ൌ ܼ௧ାଵ ൅ ܤ௧ܴ ൅ ܧ௧ାଵ  (7) 
The stock balance ሺܼ௧ାଵሻ in period ݐ ൅ 1 is determined by his previous period’s stock 
investment choice (ܵ௧) and stock market return (ܴ௧ାଵ). The next period’s total wealth ( ௧ܹାଵ) is 
the sum of realized financial investment (stock account plus bond account balances) and labor 
earnings (ܧ௧). Depending on how the investor elects next period’s stock investment, we have two 
cases. 
                                                     
15 We could have considered three accounts, namely a brokerage account for stock investment, a savings account for 
bond investments, and a checking account for consumption as in Abel et. al (2013). In our study, however, the focus 
is not on the transaction costs of transferring between checking and investment accounts (i.e., stock and bond 
investment accounts). Moreover, evidence on investor inertia also suggests that investors are not greatly affected by 
transactions costs (Brunnermeier and Nagel 2008). Additionally, most banks provide free transfers between savings 
and checking accounts, and money market funds provide bond returns while allowing frequent withdrawals. Thus, 
here we focus on a case where investors can consume from their total liquid assets (stock+bond+labor earnings) and 
incur time costs when collecting or processing information to manage their stock/bond portfolios. 
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Inertia (ࡿ࢚ ൌ ࢆ࢚): The investor exhibits portfolio inertia in period ݐ when he retains his current 
stock balance for the next period. This is equivalent to passively electing the current stock 
balance as his new investment choice (ܵ௧ ൌ ܼ௧), i.e. there are no withdrawals from or new 
investments into the stock account. In so doing, he incurs no time cost for financial decision 
making	ሺ߶௧ ൌ 0ሻ that he would otherwise devote to collecting and analyzing new financial 
information to implement the change. Accordingly, someone electing portfolio inertia has the 
following budget and time constraints: 
 ௧ܹାଵ ൌ ܼ௧ܴ௧ାଵ ൅ ܤ௧ܴ ൅ ܧ௧ାଵ (8) 
 ݈௧ ൅ ܮ௧ ൌ 1 (9) 
 ܼ௧ାଵ ൌ ܼ௧ܴ௧ାଵ (10) 
Also, when electing inertia, the investor does not finance his current consumption by liquidating 
part of his stock account, which makes the consumption constraint more binding (C୲ ൑ ௧ܹ െ Z୲). 
Of course his next-period balance in the stock account (ܼ௧ାଵ) may differ from that of the prior 
period (ܼ௧) because of uncertain investment returns ሺܴ௧ାଵሻ.  
Active management ሺࡿ࢚ ് ࢆ࢚ሻ: The investor exhibits active portfolio management in period ݐ 
when he explicitly chooses an investment amount in stocks; that is, he makes additional 
investments into or takes withdrawals from his stock account based on his investment decisions. 
Accordingly, the amount invested in stocks for the next period can differ from the current stock 
balance ሺܵ௧ ് ܼ௧ሻ. 16 In return, the investor must incur (age-dependent) time costs ሺ߶୲ ൐ 0ሻ in 
this period.17 The wealth and time budget constraints evolve as follows: 
                                                     
16 Conceptually it would be possible for an active investor to choose to buy and sell exactly the same amount as his 
current stock balance, but this case is not interesting from a modeling perspective and eliminated in the optimization 
process of investors. 
17 The recurring time cost (or cognitive attention/resources) for gathering and processing information for financial 
management is also consistent with a recent literature on optimal inattention and economic decision making (e.g., 
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 ௧ܹାଵ ൌ ܵ௧ܴ௧ାଵ ൅ ܤ௧ܴ ൅ ܧ௧ାଵ (11) 
 ݈௧ ൅ ܮ௧ ൅ ߶୲ ൌ 1 (12) 
 ܼ௧ାଵ ൌ ܵ௧ܴ௧ାଵ (13) 
Optimization: By defining inertia as a situation where the investor does not alter his 
stockholdings, we treat the stock account balance (ܼ௧) as a state variable within a dynamic 
optimization framework. This is because it is necessary for the investor to know his current stock 
balance before deciding whether to leave it as is (i.e., ܵ௧ ൌ ܼ௧), or to actively evaluate some 
different allocation. Other state variables include total wealth ሺ ௧ܹሻ, accumulated human capital 
ሺܪ௧ሻ	, and the wage shock ሺݕ௧ሻ. There are also four choice variables: the portfolio management 
method (i.e., portfolio inertia or active management), labor supply	ሺ݈௧ሻ, stock holdings going into 
the next period ሺܵ௧ሻ, and consumption ሺܥ௧ሻ.  
Because the portfolio management method is a discrete choice variable, we formulate the 
investors’ problem in a dynamic discrete choice model (Adda and Cooper 2000). We define 
௧ܸ௔ሺ ௧ܹ, ܪ௧, ܼ௧, ݕ௧ሻ as the investor’s discounted lifetime utility when he actively manages his 
portfolio; similarly, ௧ܸ௜ሺ ௧ܹ, ܪ௧, ܼ௧, ݕ௧ሻ denotes his discounted lifetime utility when he elects 
portfolio inertia. Then the value function at time ݐ is specified as: 
  ௧ܸሺ ௧ܹ, ܪ௧, ܼ௧, ݕ௧ሻ ≡ ݉ܽݔ൛ ௧ܸ௔ሺ ௧ܹ, ܪ௧, ܼ௧, ݕ௧ሻ, ௧ܸ௜ሺ ௧ܹ, ܪ௧, ܼ௧, ݕ௧ሻൟ.  (14) 
Let ߚ ൏ 1 be the investor’s time preference and ݌௧ the probability that he survives to the next 
period. Then the value function for active management is as follows:18 
                                                                                                                                                                            
Abel et al., 2013, Sims 2003), learning (Sargent 1993, Evans and Honkapohja 2001), and robust control (e.g., 
Giannoni 1999, Hansen and Sargent 2001, Onatski and Stock 1999). 
18 We could introduce a direct transaction cost ܶܥሺܵ௧, ܼ௧ሻ for portfolio adjustment, in which case the equation for 
total wealth would be W୲ାଵ ൌ ܵ௧ܴ௧ାଵ ൅ ܤ௧ܴ ൅ ܧ௧ାଵ െ ܶܥሺܵ௧, ܼ௧ሻ૚ሼ௔ௗ௝௨௦௧௠௘௡௧ሽ. Nevertheless, we do not focus here 
on direct monetary costs; see Bonaparte and Cooper (2009) and Campanale et al. (2012) for more on that approach.  
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௧ܸ௔ሺ ௧ܹ, ܪ௧, ܼ௧, ݕ௧ሻ ൌ maxሼ஼೟,ௌ೟,௟೟ ሽ ௧ܷ ሺܥ௧, ܮ௧ሻ ൅ ݌௧ߚॱ௧ሾ ௧ܸାଵሺ ௧ܹାଵ, ܪ௧ାଵ, ܼ௧ାଵ, ݕ௧ାଵሻሿ 
 ݏ. ݐ. ௧ܹ ൌ ܥ௧ ൅ ܵ௧ ൅ ܤ௧  
 ௧ܹାଵ ൌ ܵ௧ܴ௧ାଵ ൅ ܤ௧ܴ ൅ ܧ௧ାଵ (15) 
 ܪ௧ାଵ ൌ ሾሺ1 െ ߜ௧ሻܪ௧ ൅ ܨ௧ሺܪ௧, ݈௧ሻሿߣݐ  
 ܼ௧ାଵ ൌ ܵ௧ܴ௧ାଵ  
  ݈௧ ൅ ܮ௧ ൅ ߶௧ ൌ 1.  
The value function for portfolio inertia is as follows: 
௧ܸ௜ሺ ௧ܹ, ܪ௧, ܼ௧, ݕ௧ሻ ൌ maxሼ஼೟,௟೟	ሽ ௧ܷ ሺܥ௧, ܮ௧ሻ ൅ ݌௧ߚॱ௧ሾ ௧ܸାଵሺ ௧ܹାଵ, ܪ௧ାଵ, ܼ௧ାଵ, ݕ௧ାଵሻሿ 
 ݏ. ݐ. ௧ܹ ൌ ܥ௧ ൅ ܼ௧ ൅ ܤ௧  
 ௧ܹାଵ ൌ ܼ௧ܴ௧ାଵ ൅ ܤ௧ܴ ൅ ܧ௧ାଵ (16) 
 ܪ௧ାଵ ൌ ሾሺ1 െ ߜ௧ሻܪ௧ ൅ ܨ௧ሺܪ௧, ݈௧ሻሿߣݐ  
 ܼ௧ାଵ ൌ ܼ௧ܴ௧ାଵ  
 ݈௧ ൅ ܮ௧ ൌ 1.  
When an investor elects portfolio inertia, he does not need to re-maximize the value function with 
respect to stock holdings; instead, he takes his current stock balance ሺܼ௧ሻ as his next period’s 
stock investment (S୲). If ௧ܸ௔ ൒ ௧ܸ௜, the investor opts for active management ሺܽ௧ୀଵሻ; otherwise, 
he opts for portfolio inertia.  
The two value functions differ due to their different time constraints and next period’s 
portfolio choice. The appeal of portfolio inertia is that the time saved can then be used either to 
work and accumulate more human capital, thereby raising future earnings, or to enjoy more 
leisure. During retirement, the investor does not work, so if he decides to actively manage his 
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portfolio, he sacrifices only his leisure time. Later in retirement, decreasing financial decision 
making efficiency and rising mortality risk make inertia more appealing.19 
 
3. The Role of Financial Advisors and Dynamic Portfolio Choice with Delegation  
Next we extend the model to examine how introducing financial advisors can add value to 
life cycle decision makers. Reasons for delegating portfolio management can include time costs, 
efficiency gains due to lower transaction costs, and beliefs regarding professional managers’ 
skills. In what follows, we focus mainly on the investor’s forgone opportunity to accumulate 
more human capital associated with active management during the work life.  
When an investor elects to delegate his portfolio management to an advisor, he must pay a 
management fee from his wealth ( ௧ܹ ). In the financial advisory service industry, the fee 
generally consists of a minimum fixed fee ሺ߮௠௜௡ሻ plus a percentage fee ሺ߮௣௧௚ሻ charged on total 
assets under management.20 Formally, this structure may be expressed as follows:  
 ߮௧ ൌ max൫߮௠௜௡, ߮௣௧௚ ௧ܹ൯.  (17) 
The financial advisor not only selects the individual’s investment portfolio, but he also proposes 
optimal levels of consumption and labor supply that are in the client’s best interest.21 The value 
function for the delegated portfolio management method is then:  
ܸ݀ݐ ൫ܹݐ, ܪݐ, ܼݐ, ݕݐ൯ ൌ maxሼ஼೟,ௌ೟,௟೟ ሽ ௧ܷ ሺܥ௧, ܮ௧ሻ ൅ ݌௧ߚॱ௧ሾ ௧ܸାଵሺ ௧ܹାଵ, ܪ௧ାଵ, ܼ௧ାଵ, ݕ௧ାଵሻሿ  
 ݏ. ݐ. ௧ܹ ൌ ܥ௧ ൅ ܵ௧ ൅ ܤ௧ ൅ ߮୲ (18) 
 ௧ܹାଵ ൌ ܵ௧ܴ௧ାଵ ൅ ܤ௧ܴ ൅ ܧ௧ାଵ   
                                                     
19 Sufficient conditions for the selection of portfolio inertia are discussed in Appendix B. 
20 See Appendix A for a dicussion of the fee structures usedby SEC-registered investment advisors (RIA) in the U.S. 
21 We do not model a possible conflict of interest between clients and financial advisors, which was analyzed by 
Sharpe (1985), Stoughton et al. (2011), Ou-Yang (2003), and Mullainathan et al. (2012), among others. 
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 ܪ௧ାଵ ൌ ሾሺ1 െ ߜ௧ሻܪ௧ ൅ ܨ௧ሺܪ௧, ݈௧ሻሿ ൈ ߣݐ  
 ܼ௧ାଵ ൌ ܵ௧ܴ௧ାଵ 
݈௧ ൅ ܮ௧ ൌ 1 
 
 
Note that the investor pays the management fee ߮௧ out of his total wealth, but he does not incur 
any time cost ߶௧. The advantage of hiring the financial advisor is either more leisure or the saved 
time which can then be used to work and accumulate more job-specific knowledge.  
Accordingly, the investor’s optimization problem of finding the best portfolio 
management method can be summarized as:  
 
            ௧ܸሺ ௧ܹ, ܪ௧, ܼ௧, ݕ௧ሻ 
 ൌ ݉ܽݔሼ௔೟,௟೟,ௌ೟,஼೟	ሽ ௧ܷ ሺܥ௧, ܮ௧ሻ ൅ ݌௧ߚॱ௧ሾ ௧ܸାଵሺ ௧ܹାଵ, ܪ௧ାଵ, ܼ௧ାଵ, ݕ௧ାଵሻሿ	  
 ݏ. ݐ.		 ௧ܹ ൌ ܥ௧ ൅ ܵ௧ ൅ ܤ௧ ൅ ߮௧૚ሼ௔೟సమሽ (19) 
 ௧ܹାଵ ൌ ܵ௧ܴ௧ାଵ ൅ ܤ௧ܴ ൅ ܧ௧ାଵ  
 ܪ௧ାଵ ൌ ሾሺ1 െ ߜ௧ሻܪ௧ ൅ ܨ௧ሺܪ௧, ݈௧ሻሿ ൈ ߣݐ  
 ݈௧ ൅ ܮ௧ ൅ ߮௧૚ሼ௔೟సభሽ ൌ 1  
 ܵ௧ ൌ ܼ௧ ݂݅ ܽ௧ ൌ 0   
where ܽ௧ ൌ 0	  denotes portfolio inertia, ܽ௧ ൌ 1	 active management, and ܽ௧ ൌ 2	 hiring a 
financial advisor. ௧ܸାଵ ≡ ݉ܽݔ൛ ௧ܸାଵ௜ , ௧ܸାଵ௔ , ௧ܸାଵௗ ൟ  where ௧ܸାଵ௜  is the value function for the 
portfolio inertia case, ௧ܸାଵ௔  is the value function for active management, and ௧ܸାଵௗ  is the value 
function for delegating portfolio management. 
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4  Model Calibration and Solution 
4.1 Numerical Procedure for the Model Solution 
In our model, there is no simple Euler equation linking the marginal benefit of today’s 
portfolio adjustment with future marginal benefits, inasmuch as the investor is unsure about 
which portfolio management method he will select at each point in the future. For this reason, it 
is intractable to solve the model in a closed form. We therefore solve the model numerically via 
backward induction, multi-linear interpolation, and Monte-Carlo integration (see Appendix C for 
details). 
4.2 Parameter Calibration  
We calibrate the model using a reasonable set of base case parameters, setting the 
discount factor ߚ to 0.96, the coefficient of relative risk aversion to ߛ	 ൌ 	3, and the leisure 
preference parameter to ߙ	 ൌ 	1.0, as is conventional in other life cycle studies (see Gomes et al. 
2008; Chai et al. 2011; and Cocco and Gomes 2012). One-period survival rates ݌௧ in the utility 
function are calculated from the 2009 US Social Security Administration Trustees Report cohort 
mortality table for males born in 1990 (Bell and Miller 2012). 
An important element of the model is the human capital accumulation process (ܪ௧), which 
generates the opportunity cost of time when an investor elects to actively manage his financial 
assets. As noted above, accumulated human capital serves a similar role as the age-dependent 
wage profile in prior studies. To this end, we calibrate the human capital accumulation process by 
matching the model-generated moments with those of an age-dependent wage rate profile for 
male high school graduates derived from PSID data (as in Hubener et al. 2013).22 Based on this 
                                                     
22 Technically, we implement a simulated method of moment procedure (SMM) by numerically minimizing the 
distance of various moments (i.e., mean, standard deviation, median, skewness, kurtois, max, min and the age of 
maximum wage) of the simulated human capital accumulation process given in equations (2) and (3) relative to the 
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moment-matching process, we find that human capital ܪ௧ depreciates at an annual rate of 
ߜ௧ ൌ 0.16%൅ 0.023595 ൈ ݕ݁ܽݎ ; the elasticity parameter in the experience accumulation 
function is set to ߠ ൌ 0.0462; and the accumulation rate to ܽ ൌ 0.7596. The idiosyncratic 
shocks to human capital follow an iid lognormal distribution ݈݊ሺߣݐሻ~ܰሺെ0.5·0.0434ଶ, 0.0434ሻ. 
The standard deviation of the permanent wage shock is 0.0710 and the pre-retirement transitory 
wage shock standard deviation is 0.1726; in retirement it is 0.28 (as in Love 2010). The 
post-retirement shocks may be interpreted as income or consumption surprises due to unexpected 
out-of-pocket medical expenses or long-term care expenses. 
Retirement benefits are assumed to replace 50% of the individual’s last labor income 
ܧ௧ ൌ 0.2ܪସହ ସܻହ (ݐ ൌ 45, 46,… , ܶሻ. This formulation generates higher (lower) replacement rates 
for workers with lower (higher) average career earnings, consistent with the progressive benefit 
rules of the U.S. Social Security system (Chai et al. 2011). The riskless asset return is set to 1.01% 
and the risk premium for stocks is 4% with a standard deviation of 20.5% (Cocco et al. 2005). 
Labor income is taxed at 30% during working period and 15% after retirement. Capital gains are 
taxed at 20%. These rates reflect effective tax rates typical household faces in U.S. (Gomes et al. 
2008). 
So that the calibration embodies relatively realistic delegation fees, we have collected and 
analyzed advisory charges of registered investment advisors (RIAs) reporting to the US. Security 
and Exchange Commissions (SEC).23 We focus on retail-oriented advisors charging a percent of 
total assets under management (AUM), as this is the most common form of fee (see Appendix A 
                                                                                                                                                                            
(deterministic) age-dependent wage profile used in the literature (Gomes et al. 2008; Hubener et al. 2013). A more 
detailed explanation of this procedure appears in Appendix D.  
23 Registered Investment Advisors (RIAs) in the U.S. must file with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
before they can provide advice on financial investments including stocks, bond, and mutual funds. They can also 
help implement clients’ optimal portfolio choices; see Mitchell and Smetters (2013). See also Appendix A.. 
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for more detail). Since these fees average 1.41% per year, our baseline calibration uses this level 
(߮௣௧௚ ൌ 	1.41%ሻ. To cover fixed costs of advisory service, financial advisors often stipulate a 
minimum balance they require if they are to take on the client for a percentage fee. Below that 
level, they charge a fixed fee calculated as a set percentage times the minimum required account 
balance. For retail-oriented advisors, the minimum required account balances average about 
$240,000, which translates into a fixed fee level of $3,400. Such a high threshold for delegation 
will discourage most consumers from delegation in the real world and in our model. 24 
Accordingly, for the baseline case below, we explore investors’ choice of a delegation option by 
setting the minimum fee at ߮௠௜௡ ൌ $2,115 (commensurate with a minimum required account 
balance of $150,000 ൈ 1.41%). In sensitivity analysis, we also analyze how different fixed fees 
affect investor behavior and welfare.  
The efficiency function for financial decision making is assumed to be convex, as 
discussed above. Investors around age 50 are assumed to be most financially savvy with 
߶ଶଶ ൌ 0.03; that is, they sacrifice only 3% of their normalized time to manage their own 
portfolios. Our time cost estimate of 3% is based on the American Time Use Survey (ATUS 
2012), where people spend an average of 0.35 hours a day on financial management, or around 3% 
of the 13 hours of daily discretionary time (calculated by deducting time spent on necessary 
activity such as sleeping, eating/drinking, essential household activities, and caring for household 
members). Young investors are assumed to be less efficient (߶ଵ ൌ 0.09) than the middle-aged. 
The functional form for efficiency is assumed to be ߶௧ ൌ ଴.଴ଽି଴.଴ଷଷ଴ర ሺܽ݃݁ െ 30ሻସ ൅ 0.03, where 
the 4th power generates modest efficiency pattern changes around middle-age. In a later section, 
                                                     
24 This is one reason that our baseline model without a delegation option appears realistic for the majority of 
real-world investors. 
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we also conduct sensitivity analysis assuming different levels and shapes for the active 
management inefficiency function. Baseline parameters are summarized in Table 1.  
Table 1 here 
 
5. Results and Discussion 
We next describe investor behavior when no delegation option is available, and after that, 
we report results when individuals can elect and delegate money matters to a financial advisor. 
We use the optimal controls of the baseline parameterization to generate 2,000 simulated 
lifetimes reflecting realizations of stock returns and labor income shocks. All investors begin 
with a zero stock account balance (i.e., no inheritance, ܼ௜,ଵ ൌ 0).  
5.1 Profiles for Consumption, Wealth, Earnings, Stock Holdings, and Labor Supply: No 
Delegation Option 
Figure 1 summarizes our baseline results for the key choice variables (consumption, 
wealth, labor supply, and earnings) when delegation is not an option. Panel A indicates that the 
model generates hump-shaped wealth, earnings, and consumption profiles over the life cycle, 
consistent with those reported in other studies (e.g., Gomes et al. 2008). Consumption drops 
sharply at age 66 when households retire and begin to consume more leisure. Such a profile is in 
line with other life cycle models with endogenous work hours (Chai et al., 2011); it is also in line 
with empirical studies documenting a substantial decline in spending around the retirement date 
(Battistin et al. 2009). Panel B illustrates the average stock balance which also traces out a 
hump-shaped pattern over the life cycle. Starting with no stock balance, individuals then invest 
more in the stock market until they retire, after which they gradually decrease their exposure to 
stocks. This result is consistent with empirical findings of a hump-shaped equity share profile 
along with a hump-shaped wealth profile over the life cycle (Ameriks and Zeldes 2004). Panel C 
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traces the labor supply pattern which is slightly hump-shaped over time. Average lifetime labor 
supply equals 0.35, which corresponds to about 1,820 work hours per year (assuming a time 
endowment of 100 waking hours per week). This is similar to prior work (see Gomes et al. 2003 
and 2008, Chai et al. 2011) and it is also in line with empirical evidence for U.S. workers.25. On 
average, the stock of human capital rises with age, but at a decreasing rate.  
Figure 1 here 
5.2 Portfolio Inertia and Equity Choices: No Delegation Option 
Figure 2 shows optimal choice patterns of portfolio management method and equity 
holdings over the life cycle when delegation is unavailable. Panel A illustrates how people 
optimally manage their portfolios depending on whether inertia or active management dominates. 
As is evident, inertia is the dominant strategy for young investors to about age 30; thereafter, 
active management becomes more prevalent until retirement, whereupon even more switch to 
active management early in retirement (the fraction of active managing investors rises from 
around half at age 64 to about 60% at age 65). Later in life, people again revert to inertia.  
Figure 2 here 
The reason for this pattern is that the young have little financial wealth, but they will need 
forgo much human capital investment when they devote time to manage their meager financial 
assets. They also have a longer horizon over which they can use their human capital to generate 
labor earnings. Conversely, later in life, people have more wealth and a smaller opportunity cost 
of time. This is because they have a shorter work lives remaining and have already accumulated 
substantial human capital. Accordingly, sacrificing a small amount of time to manage their 
                                                     
25 The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS Economic releases Table B-2) report average weekly working 
hours of 34.6 hours. The OECD documents about 1,800 annual working hours for U.S. workers 
("http://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx?DataSetCode=ANHRS"), which is similar value reported by Low 
(2005) using data from the Consumer Expenditure Survey. 
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finances has only a modest impact on their wages. Still, however, almost half of the middle-aged 
group does not change portfolio allocations; such a high level of inactivity is consistent with 
several empirical studies (Ameriks and Zeldes 2004; Bilias et al. 2009; Calvet et al. 2009a; 
Mitchell et al. 2007; and Vissing-Jorgensen 2003). Among the older group with lower wealth, 
their reduced decision making efficiency and increased mortality risk somewhat depresses their 
interest in active management. Early in retirement, older people are much more likely to switch 
to active management to rebalance their portfolios, now that they have more free time. The 
fraction of actively managing investors thus jumps from 50% at age 64 to about 60% at age 65. 
As time goes by, however, reduced wealth and income shrink the budget constraint for 
consumption, which in turn reduces utility from actively managing financial assets. Additionally, 
rising mortality risk boosts their preference for current consumption and leisure. These factors all 
lead to more inertia later in life.  
Our U-shaped pattern of portfolio inertia is compatible with available empirical evidence. 
For instance, in our model, young investors who start with a zero stock account balance remain 
out of the stock market (i.e. S୲ ൌ Z୲ ൌ 0). This is consistent with results in the PSI from Bilias et 
al. (2009). Our model also implies that middle-aged and older investors are more likely to 
particpate in the market, but older investors exhibit more inertia. This conforms to evidence from 
Bilias et al. (2009) who showed that the conditional probability of inertia is lower for the middle 
aged, whereas older investors are less likely to trade than the middle-aged even when they hold 
stocks.26  In sum, our baseline settings appear to be in line with empirically-observed U-shaped 
                                                     
26 In an untabulated analysis of our simulated data, we find that young investors, conditional on holding 
stocks, are more likely to trade compared to middle-aged investors consistent with the PSID data (Bilias et 
al. 2009). 
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inertia patterns. Young investors tend not to hold stocks, and older investors do but tend not to 
trade. 
It is also of interest to note that our overall inertia levels are comparable to the empirical 
findings reported by Bilias et al. (2009). For instance, across all age groups, they find 40-70% 
inertia among stock owners (depending on the survey year); our model generates 47% inertia 
among those who own stocks (and 57% unconditional on stock ownership). If we were to use a 
the narrower definition of inertia meaning no trading in a five-year time span, our model 
generates 33% inertia conditional on stock holding, close to the 39-56% fraction over a five-year 
period in the data. 
Panel B of Figure 2 illustrates the fraction of financial wealth invested in equity changes 
over the life cycle when no delegation option is available.27 The solid line reflects the average 
fraction in equities for the subgroup of inertia investors. The dotted line refers to the 
corresponding equity share for active investors (the overall average is indicated by the dashed 
line). Consistent with most prior life cycle models with uncertain labor income, active investors 
hold almost 100% of their savings in equity early in life, and glide down to lower shares as they 
age. The explanation is that future labor income can be thought of as a implicit bond position, so 
workers will seek to diversify their overall wealth position consisting of human capital and 
financial wealth. Conditional on becoming active, they follow the traditional investment strategy 
recommended by previous life cycle studies (as in Cocco et al. 2005; and Merton 1971). By 
contrast, inertia investors allocate less to equity when young and invest more in equity when old. 
This is because young investors start with a zero stock balance and little wealth, so they are more 
likely to choose inertia and hence invest nothing in equity. As they accumulate wealth, they begin 
                                                     
27 In our notation, the equity share of each investor is defined as ܵ௧ ሺܵ௧ ൅ ܤ௧ሻ⁄ . 
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to manage more actively and accumulate equity. Between age 30 and 60, the equity fraction of 
the inertia investor is rather flat, at around 60%. Interestingly, at retirement there is a sharp drop 
of the equity fraction for inertia investors. The reason is that early retirees reallocate substantial 
amounts of equities once toward bonds before they start to draw down during retirement. This, in 
turn, can be explained by the fact that older investors facing rising mortality risk and more 
inefficiency in financial decision making understand that active financial management implies 
rising opportunity costs.28 Because inertia-investors gradually deplete their wealth from their 
bond accounts and defer selling off their equity accounts, their equity share increases over time in 
later years. 
Overall, combining the cases of inertia and active-management investors, we observe that 
the average equity share (the dashed line in Figure 2, Panel B) rises for younger individuals and 
declines steadily afterwards. Although those electing active management at older ages optimally 
choose lower equity shares, the fact that older inertia investors retain a high equity share implies 
that stock holdings do not decline sharply with age. In sum, in our model people optimally do not 
invest in stocks early in their life, but in middle age they gradually move into stock, and then they 
curtail stockholdings later in life, while still retaining a reasonable share.  
Figure 3 displays scatter plots of stock account balances for active and inertia investors; 
the solid line indicates average stock balances in each case. It is clear that those active managers 
hold more in equities than do inertia investors. Individuals having greater equity exposure find it 
optimal to allocate more time to portfolio management and become active investors. Nevertheless, 
the average does not imply that all inertia investors eschew equities. In fact, as the right panel in 
Figure 3 illustrates, a large group of those who are inactive still hold substantial stock positions. 
                                                     
28 The gradual decumuation of assets from the bond account is not due to time costs, in contrast to 
transactions from the stock account. 
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If an investor expects he will end up choosing a similar consumption/labor supply pair next 
period, a small change in his portfolio will be costly without enhancing his discounted lifetime 
utility. In such a case, it will then be optimal for him not to alter his portfolio (Appendix B 
discusses a sufficient condition for inertia choice).  
Figure 3 here 
Table 2 illustrates how portfolio inertia and equity trading patterns vary over the life cycle. 
We also show how patterns differ by wealth level (above and below $150,000), to illustrate how 
wealth is related to portfolio management choice and subsequent trading patterns. Some 
two-thirds (67%) of the lower wealth middle-aged investors elect inertia, while only one-fifth 
(20%) of the same age group with more than $150,000 elect inertia. This pattern confirms to our 
model of the opportunity costs of active financial management: low-wealth investors do not 
sacrifice time to manage their accounts, while wealthier individuals do. Table 2 also shows that 
the factors driving active management vary over the work life. Active investors buy stocks while 
young and sell their stocks while old. In the 20-35 age range, almost two-thirds (62%) of wealthy 
investors buy equities seeking to capture the equity premium; in their 60s and 70s, almost 60% 
actively sell stocks to finance consumption.     
Table 2 here 
Table 3 presents summary statistics concerning the dynamics of portfolio management 
methods when no delegation option is feasible. On average, the first time that people elect active 
management is about nine years after entering the labor force. They elect inertia for 46 years and 
manage their own portfolios for 34 years, altering their management strategies 12 times over their 
lifetimes. Some 12% of people (=1-[1,767/2,000]) never elect active management and remain 
inactive throughout their entire lifetimes.  
Table 3 here 
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5.3 Portfolio Management: With a Delegation Option 
Next we turn to an evaluation of how portfolio management methods change optimally 
when a financial advisor is available. Table 4 summarizes results. On average, investors now 
change their portfolio management approach much more often, almost 19 times over their lives 
(18.82, versus 11.55 in Table 3), and they elect inertia for a shorter period (44.94 years, versus 
45.97 in Table 2). Of most interest is the fact that people devote about half as many years to 
active management (17.69 versus 34.03 previously), and they engage advisors for just under 
one-quarter of their adult lives (=17.36 years/80). Investors begin to delegate relatively soon, 
only 8.39 years from starting work, and about 80% of people elect to delegate at some point 
(79%=1,581/2,000). Additionally, when delegation is an option, fewer choose active 
management and those who do, begin later, 14.31 years after starting work (versus 8.95 in Table 
3). 
Table 4 here 
Table 5 shows what happens when investors can delegate their investment management to 
a financial advisor. Panel A illustrates patterns of portfolio managment methods by age, where 
we see that access to delegation reduces inertia and active-management, compared to the findings 
in Figure 2. Delegation is attractive for investors of all ages: approximately 19% of investors 
younger than age 35, 2% of middle-aged investors (age 30-65), and around 37% of old retirees 
(age 80+) now optimally delegate to a financial advisor. Access to delegation substantially 
reduces active management, especially among the youngest and oldest investors. Active 
management is adopted by only a small fraction of the youngest (8%) and oldest investors (2%), 
but by many more (around 30%) middle-aged and early retirees (about 50%). Early retires 
become the most active investor group because they have no opportunity cost of forgone labor 
supply and must optimally withdraw from their stock accounts to meet retirement consumption 
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needs. Rather than paying a delegation fee, they instead actively manage their stock accounts by 
withdrawing before mortality risk rises, and prior to a decline in decision making efficiency. 
Table 5 here 
Panel B of Table 5 decomposes portfolio management methods when the delegation 
option is available. Among those initially electing inertia or active management, younger and 
older investors are more likely to switch to delegation. Among middle-aged individuals (36-65), 
active investors are more likely to continue with active management. This pattern is related to the 
opportunity cost of time. Young investors, who have the longest horizon to earn human capital 
returns, find it optimal to elect the delegation option. Older investors facing high mortality risk 
and inefficiency of financial management also favor financial advisors, to save them leisure time. 
By contrast, middle-aged investors with high wealth and human capital face a lower opportunity 
cost of time, and hence they will manage their portfolios themselves and avoid paying the 
delegation fee. Early retirees are more likely to engage in active management as they need not 
worry about accumulating job-specific skills any more. It should be noted that the decision to 
delegate among the young and old investors is affected by the assumption regarding a required 
minimum fixed fee: some inertia investors cannot gain access to financial advisors, as they have 
insufficient wealth. Below we discuss how lowering the minimum fixed fee shapes investors’ 
decisions to hire an advisor.  
Panel C of Table 5 represents the average fraction of savings invested in equities, 
depending on whether the investor elected inertia, active management, or delegation. For 
investors choosing active management, the fraction of savings invested in equity follows an 
age-related glide path consistent with the traditional portfolio choice literature. Inertia investors 
hold little equity when young and more equity when old, similar to the no delegation case. 
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Interestingly, the delegated portfolio also follows a downward-sloping glide path, but the slope is 
flatter. 
Table 6 summarizes changes in behavior when a delegation option is available for wealth, 
equity share, labor income, labor supply, human capital, and consumption by age. All are 
expressed as a percent of the no-delegation base case. Results show that having access to an 
advisor increases wealth by 0.5-1.7% across age groups. This is due to the higher equity share 
noted above, and also to spending more time on the job which builds human capital. Having 
access to an advisor also increases leisure around 2-4% during the work and about 7% in 
retirement, and raises consumption considerably among the young.  
Table 6 here 
5.4 Determinants of Portfolio Management Methods 
Next we use descriptive multinomial Logit regressions to summarize the factors 
associated with investors’ portfolio management methods in our simulated data. Tables 7 and 8 
show how the probability of choosing inertia over active management when a delegation option 
is (or is not) available, is associated to lagged wealth, stock market shocks, and wage shocks.  
Tables 7 and 8 here 
When no delegation is feasible, wealthier investors are less likely to engage in inertia as 
indicated in the first column of Table 7 and consistent with empirical findings (Agnew et al. 2003, 
Bilias et al. 2008, and Calvet et al. 2009). This is because sticking to a non-optimal level of 
equity exposure is more costly for them, compared to the less wealthy. The second column 
indicates that investors experiencing negative stock market shocks and positive wage shocks are 
more likely to elect portfolio inertia, due to their need to invest more in human capital and avoid 
risky equity. Investors experiencing good labor market shocks elect inertia rather than actively 
managing their assets, as their opportunity costs of active management are higher. Having a 
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lagged negative stock market shock reduces investor overall wealth, which subsequently 
decreases their interest in actively managing their portfolios. The third column includes all 
regressors, and results are similar. 
A similar analysis but now allowing delegation is provided in Table 8. Panel A uses 
active management as the reference group; as before, wealthier individuals are less likely to 
engage in inertia. Comparing delegation and active management, people with additional wealth 
would like to choose active management. Although wealthy investors have more need to delegate, 
they also must pay higher delegation fees; in our model, the cost outweighs the benefits. Negative 
stock market shocks make inertia more attractive than active management, as before, but they 
also enhance the appeal of delegation over active management because people find it optimal to 
pay a delegation fee given their lower wealth rather than incurring the opportunity time cost.  
Positive wage shocks lead investors to choose inertia over active management, but they 
have two offsetting effects on the delegation versus active management decision. A positive wage 
shock increases the opportunity cost of active management, but it also increases the advisory fee 
due to higher wealth levels. Our analysis shows that the opportunity cost saving is more 
influential than the wealth effect. In sum, negative wealth or stock return shocks, or positive labor 
earnings surprises, lead investors to select inertia or delegation, and to avoid active management.   
Panel C of Table 8 uses inertia as the reference group, where we now see that wealthy 
investors are more likely to choose delegation rather than inertia because suboptimal portfolio 
choice is more costly to them, compared to their poorer counterparts. Positive stock market 
surprises increase wealth so the cost of inertia rises, boosting demand for delegation. At the same 
time, however, this also means they will pay more in fees, due to their greater wealth. In our 
analysis, these costs and benefits offset each other, so positive stock surprises do not provide an 
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unambiguous prediction about the choice between delegation vs. inertia. Investors experiencing a 
positive labor earnings shock are more likely to choose inertia over delegation.  
Comparing Panels A and B of Table 8, we can highlight what drives investors’ 
preferences for the three portfolio management methods given shocks. Favorable wealth shocks 
lead to an overall preferred ordering of active management, delegation, and inertia. Positive stock 
surprises make active management more attractive than delegation or inertia, without a clear 
ranking of the latter two methods. In response to a favorable labor earnings development, 
investors order the options as inertia, delegation, and active management.   
 
6. Sensitivity Analysis and Welfare Gains from Access to Financial Advice 
 
6.1 Examining the Impact of Learning by Doing  
 
To more clearly illustrate the importance of learning by doing in our model, we next 
conduct a sensitivity analysis by building and solving a model without the learning by doing 
mechanism used in our base case above. To do so, we restate the human capital function as 
follows:  
 ܪ௧ାଵ ൌ ൫ሺ1 െ ߜ଴ െ ߜଵݐሻܪ௧ ൅ ܽ଴ ൅ ܽଵݐ ൅ ܽଶݐଶ൯ߣ. (20) 
The experience accumulation part ܨ௧ሺ݈௧, ܪ௧ሻ in our original human capital accumulation process 
is now replaced by a deterministic function of age with parameters (ܽ଴, ܽଵ, ܽଶ). We then 
re-estimate parameters of this new human capital process (δ଴, ߜଵ, ܽ଴, ܽଵ, ܽଶ, ߣ ) along with 
parameters of wage rate shocks (transitory and permanent wage shock) by matching the model’s 
moment conditions with the moments of empirically-observed wage profiles of male high school 
graduates derived using the PSID (Hubener et al. 2013).29    
                                                     
29 The estimated values are -0.0125 (δ଴), -0.00012542 (δଵ), 0.0011 (a଴), -0.0080 (aଵ), 0.000081419 (aଶ), 6.49 % (λ), 
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Having turned off learning by doing, we next re-solve the model and compare results with 
our benchmark case (see Table 9). Before discussing findings, it is useful to note that there are 
two competing forces driving inertia when there is no learning by doing. The first is the reduced 
opportunity cost of active management which boosts active management (i.e., decreases inertia): 
an investor managing his own assets must sacrifice only current leisure time or earnings, but not 
future human capital. The second results from the reduced attractiveness of work given that 
employment no longer enhances future wages. This reduces labor supply and earnings as well as 
wealth, which in turn makes active management less profitable; the result is to discourage active 
management (i.e., increase inertia).  
Table 9 here 
 Column 2 of Table 9 show that the latter effect dominates, with an overall increase in 
inertia. Compared to the baseline (Column 1), the inertia fraction rises, on average, by 12.1%, 
11.3%, and 9.7% for ages 20-45, 45-60, and 65+, respectively. Additionally, labor supply falls by 
about 39% for those age 20-45 and 23% for those age 45-60. As anticipated, young investors 
respond to the attractiveness of future labor market prospect more sensitively. 
6.2 The Impact of the Initial Stock Market Participation Cost 
Next we extend our model to include a fixed initial cost of stock market participation (as 
in Cocco 2005, Gomes and Michaelides 2005). Because our model already has a stock account 
balance (Z୲) as a state variable, we can define initial stock market participation as the case when 
the investor’s current period’s stock balance (Z୲ሻ is zero, but his chosen stock investment (S୲ሻ 
out of savings is positive. This permits us to avoid creating an additional state variable.30 
                                                                                                                                                                            
30.78% (transitory wage shock), 6.87% (permanent wage shock). 
30 This specification cannot rule out the possibility that an investor would need to incur participation costs again 
when he returns to stock market after liquidating his entire equity position. However our simulation results show that 
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We model the fixed market participation cost as a fraction of the permanent wage shock 
(as in Gomes and Michaelides 2005). Given an initial fixed cost of stock market participation, 
wealth evolves as follows:  
 ௧ܹାଵ ൌ ܵ௧ܴ௧ାଵ ൅ ሺ ௧ܹ െ ܥ௧ െ ܵ௧ሻܴ ൅ ܧ௧ାଵ െ ܨ ൈ ௜ܻ,௧ ൈ ܫ௜,௧		 (21) 
where ௜ܻ,௧ is a permanent wage shock and ܫ௜,௧	 is an indicator variable for initial stock market 
participation having 1 when Z୲ ൌ 0 and S୲ ൐ 0. As in Gomes and Michaelides (2005), the 
fixed cost ܨ is set at 2.5% of the permanent wage shock. Column 3 of Table 9 presents the 
result of portfolio management methods with initial participation cost. The new solution shows 
that overall pattern of inertia over the life cycle is same as before and the proportion of inertia 
managers increases only marginally in the early years. In the first 20 years, initial participation 
costs increases inertia only by 1.8%; after that the impact becomes minimal. In other words, an 
initial participation cost cannot fully explain observed inertia patterns in the data.  
We also conduct a test to determine whether the U-shaped time cost is responsible for the 
the U-shaped pattern of inertia over the life cycle. Our analysis shows that this is not the case. For 
instance, when we set the time cost at 3% for all ages, column 4 of Table 9 shows that 70% of 
young investors (age 20-35) choose inertia, 49% of middle-aged investors (ages 50-65), 40% of 
early retirees (age 65-80), and 55 % of old investors (age 80+). The ratio of inertia investors is 
slightly lower for the youngest and oldest investors, compared to the baseline case, but the 
U-shaped pattern is still clearly evident.  
Column 5 of Table 9 presents a sensitivity analysis for college graduates, to evaluate how 
wage/age profiles influences results. We re-estimate parameters of the human capital process 
with the observed wage trend for college graduates in the PSID and re-solve the model. 
                                                                                                                                                                            
the fraction of returning stock investors is minimal to none (zero in 2,000 simulations). 
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Compared to the baseline case of high school graduates, college graduates earn higher labor 
income, have higher wealth, work more, and invest more in equity. Compared to the baseline 
case, the inertia level for college grads is modestly less than for the high school educated: 73% vs 
76% for ages 20-35, 46% vs. 50% for ages 50-65, and 40% vs. 44% for ages 80+). The U-shaped 
pattern of inertia again persists.  
6.3 Welfare Analysis of a Delegation Option and Sensitivity Analysis 
To assess how consumers value access to a delegation option, we next compare donsumer 
welfare in a delegation regime versus that in a no-delegation world. We measure this in terms of 
a certainty equivalent (CE) consumption stream change, or the stream of consumption that would 
afford the investor the same level of expected lifetime utility if he lacked access to the delegation 
option, versus having it (Cocco et al. 2005). 31 Table 10, Panel A, shows for our baseline 
specification (Column 1) that providing investors with access to a financial advisor increases 
lifetime welfare by the equivalent of a 1.2% enhancement in their annual consumption streams. 
This is similar in magnitude to that reported in Cocco et al. (2005), who compared welfare levels 
in two worlds, one with a fixed and the other with a flexible equity share.  
Table 10 here 
We also conduct a sensitivity analysis for different costs of financial advice, to evaluate 
investors’ potential welfare gains from lowering entry barriers to financial advisory services. As 
noted above, current industry practice is to set a minimum fixed fee commensurate with a 
                                                     
31 The certainty equivalent constant consumption stream ሺܿ஼ாሻ is defined as:  
ଵܸሺ ଵܹ, ܪଵ, ܼଵ, ݕଵሻ ൌ ܧ ൥෍ߚ௧ ൬ෑ ݌௜
௧
௜ୀ଴
൰ 11 െ ߛ ሺܥ௧ሺܮ௧ሻ
ఈሻଵିఊ	
்
௧ୀ଴
൩ ൌ 	෍ߚ௧
்
௧ୀ଴
൬ෑ ݌௜
௧
௜ୀ଴
൰ 11 െ ߛ ሺܥ஼ாሺܮ∗ሻ
ఈሻଵିఊ 
where ܮ∗  is a fixed level of leisure and ሺ ଵܺ, ܪଵ, ܼଵ, ݕଵሻ  is a pair of state variables. With some algebraic 
manipulation, we get: 
ܥ஼ா ൌ ቈ ሺ1 െ ߛሻ ଵܸ∑ ߚ௧ሺ∏ ݌௜௧௜ୀ଴ ሻሺܮ∗ఈሻଵିఊ௧்ୀ଴ ቉
ଵ
ଵିఊ
 
In calculating this measure, we set leisure ܮ∗ as time deducted from mean labor hours over working years. 
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required minimum asset balance of about $240,000, which is high compared to average investors’ 
asset levels. Column 2 of Panel A shows that eliminating the minimum fee for advisory services 
would raise welfare by 1.43%, compared to the case where no delegation is available. This 
welfare improvement results from the fact that less-wealthy investors gain access to cheapter 
financial advice, allowing them to use their time for leisure or work. Column 2 of Panel B shows 
that, compared to the baseline case, eliminating the minimum fee leads younger investors (age 
20-35) to increase their usage of a financial advisor by 15% percentage points, and in retirement, 
financial advice utilization rises by about 8%. At the same time, both inertia and active 
management decline. Conversely, as seen in Column 3, Panel A, a higher minimum fee 
commensurate with the industry’s average required minimum balance of around $250,000 cuts 
the welfare gains by about 20%, compared to the case of no minimum fee (Column 2). In Panel B, 
Column 3, we see that very few people, mainly those at the top of the wealth distribution, access 
the servce at this higher cost. Only about 1.8% of young investors (aged 20~35) select the 
delegation option and during retirement, only about 15% seek financial advice.32 Compared to 
the no minimum fee case (Column 2), a higher minimum fee induces the young (age 20-35) and 
older (age 65+) investors to choose more inertia than middle-aged investors. In this case, when 
portfolio adjustment becomes necessary, most people find it optimal to manage their money 
themselves (i.e., actively manage), rather than to pay the high advisory fee (i.e., delegation). In 
other words, lowering the entry barrier to financial advisory services can help people of all ages 
(especially the young and the old) manage their financial assets optimally, and thereby save their 
scarcest resource, time for accumulating more job-specific skills or enjoying leisure.  
  
                                                     
32 With this level of minium fee, retirees (aged +65) become the main customer group.  
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7.  Conclusion 
Though individuals are increasingly expected to manage their own finances with 
ever-more complex financial products, most people in fact exhibit investor inertia, devoting only 
sparse attention to their financial portfolios and fail to actively manage their finances. To 
understand what might seem to be puzzling behavior, we build and solve a realistically-calibrated 
life cycle model where the time cost required to manage one’s portfolio is traded off with the 
opporutnity to accumulate job-specific knowledge. Using reasonable parameters, we show that 
our model implies sensible patterns of portfolio inertia across age groups. Investors who can 
accumulate job-specific knowledge by working tend to devote less time to managing their money 
when young. Middle-age individuals have more assets to invest and suffer less from the 
opportunity costs of active portfolio management, though many still elect inertia. Declining 
decision making efficiency and rising mortality risk later in life prompts many older investors to 
elect portfolio inertia. When investors can delegate portfolio management to a financial advisor, 
this enables many to avoid portfolio inertia. In general, our model predicts that younger and older 
investors will find financial advisors most attractive. Finally, we find important welfare gains 
result from having a delegation option.  
This research contributes to a growing body of research on decision making over the life 
cycle,33 an area of substantial policy interest in the wake of the global financial crisis. In the US 
for instance, the White House recently convened a multi-agency meeting of behavioral 
economists and psychologists to better understand how decision making changes with age (NIA 
2013). Our work adds to the discussion by developing and simulating a life cycle model to 
illustrate optimal portfolio management methods selected by finitely-lived investors who face 
                                                     
33 For instance, see Agarwal et al. (2009); Korniotis and Kumar (2011); and Samanez-Larkin and Knutson (2014). 
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portfolio management costs and an age-dependent inefficiency pattern for financial decision 
making.  
 One topic we do not take up here is the possibility of a conflict of interest between an 
investor seeking to maximize his utility, and his financial advisor seeking to maximize his own 
income.34 For example, if an advisor’s compensation is commission-based, he may be more 
likely to encourage return-chasing or high-fee actively managed mutual funds (Mullainathan et al. 
2012). The present paper considers only fee-based advice, which is less susceptible to such 
conflicts, but future work could consider the potential for moral hazard if investors are 
uninfomed. Additional extensions might also extend our model with parameter uncertainty and 
learning (Brennan 1998; Xia 2001). Nevertheless our key insight linking job-specific human 
capital and portfolio inertia will still be relevant, as long as a time cost of financial management 
has negative consequences for labor market earnings.   
Our findings should be of interest to a variety of stakeholders including individual 
investors, financial advisors, retirement plan sponsors, and policymakers. In particular, we show 
that those who most value financial advisory services are the young and the older age groups, so 
making such services available can enhance their well-being. Also of interest is the prediction 
that some middle-aged clients will wish to continue actively manage their own financial assets, 
even when a delegation option is available. Policymakers could do more to enhance welfare gains 
by improving investor access to financial advisory services. When financial advisors with 
fiduciary responsibility can help investors manage their financial wealth optimally, this will 
enable more people to accrue job-specific skills, thus contributing to the economy as a whole.
                                                     
34 See for instance Bergstresser et al. (2009), Hackethal et al. (2012) and Stoughton et al. (2011).  
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Table 1: Parameter Values for Numerical Solution of Baseline Model  
 
 Parameter Baseline Value 
 Working periods 45 
 Retirement periods  35 
 Time discounting β 0.96 
 Risk aversion γ 3 
 Leisure preference α 1.0 
 Experience formulation  a 0.0462 
 Elasticity of ܪ௧ accumulation ߠ 0.7596 
 Depreciation of Human Capital ߜ௧ 0.16%+0.023595ൈyear 
 Inefficiency of financial decision making ϕ௧  ଴.଴ଽି଴.଴ଷଷ଴ర ሺ ݐ െ 30ሻସ+0.03 
 Std. dev. of permanent wage shock 0.0710 
 Std. dev. of human capital shock 0.0434 
 Std. dev. of transitory wage shock (pre-retirement) 0.1726 
 Std. dev. of transitory earnings shock 
(post-retirement) 
0.28 
 Replacement rate 20% of maximum earnings at age 65 
 Risk premium 0.04 
 Std. dev. of stock return ߪ௦௧௢௖௞ 0.205 
 Risk free rate ௙ܴ 1.01 
 Delegation annual fee: variable rate ߮௣௧௚ 1. 41% per annum 
 Delegation annual fee: fixed fee ߮௠௜௡ (1.41% of  
min. req’d balance of $150,000) 
$2,115 
 Correlation between wage and stock return σఢௌ 0.0 
 Initial wealth for simulation ଴ܹ 0 
 Initial human capital for simulation ܪ଴ 10 
 Initial stock balance for simulation Z଴ 0 
 Initial wage shock for simulation ݕ଴ 0.1 
Notes: This table summarizes our baseline model parameter settings. 
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Table 2: Portfolio Inertia and Stock Trading Behavior over the Life Cycle 
 Total Wealth < $150,000  Total Wealth ൒ $150,000 
 Inertia Active Management  Inertia Active Management 
Age No Trade Bought Sold  No Trade Bought Sold 
20-35 0.783 0.156 0.061  0.133 0.623 0.244 
36-50 0.665 0.143 0.192  0.202 0.426 0.372 
51-65 0.750 0.108 0.142  0.164 0.386 0.450 
66+ 0.755 0.101 0.143  0.029 0.382 0.589 
 
 
Notes: This table shows the proportion of investors by total wealth and age who exhibited inertia (i.e., no 
stock purchase), purchased additional stock, or sold stock. Results tabulated from 2,000 independent 
simulation runs of base case model without a delegation option. The cut-off point for total wealth (see 
equation 8) is based on the medium level of wealth for middle-aged investors.  
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Table 3: Dynamics of Portfolio Management over the Life Cycle with No Delegation Option 
 
 Mean Std Median 5%-Q 95%-Q N 
No. of switches 11.55 7.02 12.00 0.00 22.00 2,000 
Years of inertia 45.97 25.00 42.00 13.00 80.00 2,000 
Years of active mgmt 34.03 25.00 38.00 0.00 67.00 2,000 
First year of active mgmt 8.95 8.23 7.00 4.00 24.00 1,767 
 
Notes: Results tabulated from 2,000 simulation runs of base case model. No. of switches refers to the 
number of times someone changed portfolio management method (from active-managed to inertia or vice 
versa) between age 20 and 100, conditional on survival. Years of inertia refers to the total length of the 
inertia period for specific simulated life cycle paths, and years of active mgmt refers to the total length of 
the active management period over specific simulated life cycle paths. First year of active mgmt refers to 
the first year when an individual changes from inertia to active management. Some people never elect 
active management and remain inactive throughout their entire lifetimes which is why the total number of 
observations of first year of active mgmt is less than the total number of simulations. 
   
 
Table 4: Dynamics of Portfolio Management over the Life Cycle with a Delegation Option 
 Mean Std Median 5%-Q 95%-Q N 
No of switches 18.82 10.74 22.00 0.00 33.00 2,000 
Years of inertia 44.94 25.49 40.00 11.00 80.00 2,000 
Years of active mgmt 17.69 11.42 20.00 0.00 34.00 2,000 
Years of delegation 17.36 15.93 15.00 0.00 42.00 2,000 
First year change  8.39 7.94 6.00 4.00 21.00 1,778 
   First year active mgmt 14.31 8.44 13.00 7.00 26.00 1,776 
   First year delegation 9.26 10.35 6.00 4.00 29.00 1,581 
 
Notes: For definitions, see Table 3. Also Years of delegation refers to the length of the delegated 
management period for the specified simulated life cycle paths. First year delegation refers to the first 
year when people change to delegation from inertia or from active management. Results tabulated from 
2,000 simulation runs of base case model. Some people never elect active management or delegation 
which is why the total number of observations of first year of active mgmt and first year delegation is less 
than the total number of simulations. 
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Table 5: Portfolio Management Transitions and Equity Choice Over the Life Cycle: With a 
Delegation Option  
A. Choice of Portfolio Management Method by Age (%) 
 
Age 20-35 36-50 50-65 65-80 80+ Total 
Inertia 73.39  50.87  49.3  44.43  61.22  56.18 
Active mgmt 7.87  28.68  29.89  48.34  2.38  22.12 
Delegation 18.73  20.45  20.81  7.23  36.39  21.7 
 
B. Portfolio Management Transitions by Age, with a Delegation Option (%) 
 
Age 20-35 36-50 50-65 65-80 80+ Total 
Inertia to:       
   Inertia 70.96  44.06  43.14  41.86  59.09  52.28 
   Active mgmt 1.45  4.87  4.35  2.25  0.14  2.46 
   Delegation 3.62  2.71  2.5  0.33  4.06  2.73 
Active management to:       
   Inertia 2.43  6.81  6.16  2.57  2.14  3.9 
   Active mgmt 6.42  23.8  25.54  46.09  2.24  19.66 
   Delegation 15.11  17.74  18.31  6.9  32.34  18.97 
 
C. Equity Fraction out of Savings by Age (%) 
 
Age 20-35 36-50 50-65 65-80 80+ Total 
Inertia 0.333  0.622  0.572  0.482  0.483  0.484 
Active mgmt 0.913  0.819  0.714  0.563  0.370  0.682 
Delegation 0.743  0.715  0.653  0.461  0.371  0.548 
Total 0.456  0.698  0.631  0.519  0.440  0.542 
 
Notes: This table illustrates life cycle patterns of portfolio management methods and equity share when 
delegation is feasible. Panel A shows the fraction of investors selecting inertia, active management, or 
delegation by age. Panel B traces trasitions across portfolio management methods, given a delegation 
option. Panel C depicts the average fraction of saving invested in equities depending on whether the 
investor elects inertia, active management, or delegation. Savings is the total wealth minus consumption. 
Averages are generated from 2,000 independent simulations for individuals based on optimal feedback 
controls from the baseline specification of the life cycle model. 
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Table 6: Change in Key Variables: With vs. Without a Delegation Option (%) 
 
Age 
Total 
Wealth 
Equity 
Share 
Labor 
Income 
Consump- 
tion 
Labor 
Supply 
Human 
Capital 
Leisure 
20-35 1.68 1.68 5.78 4.22 5.44 0.04 2.09 
36-50 1.49 1.56 10.59 9.24 9.07 0.10 3.49 
51-65 0.89 2.14 11.74 12.79 9.69 0.10 3.73 
66+ 0.56 1.21 - 0.18 - - 6.69 
 
Notes: The numbers represent the percentage increase in key variables for all individuals summed over 
those in the age group having access to a delegation option versus not having access to a delegation 
option. Equity share is a fraction of equity investment in savings (ܵ௧ ሺܵ௧ ൅ ܤ௧ሻ⁄ ). Averages for total wealth 
are value-weighted. See text. 
 
 
Table 7: Factors Associated with Portfolio Inertia (versus Active Management) with No 
Delegation Option: Marginal Effects from Descriptive Logit Analysis 
 
Inertia Chosen (vs Active Management) 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
ܹ݈݁ܽݐ݄ሼିଵሽ  ‐2.568***  ‐2.571*** 
(0.01)  (0.01) 
ܵݐ݋ܿ݇	݉ܽݎ݇݁ݐ	ݏ݄݋ܿ݇ሼିଵሽ  ‐0.077***  ‐0.083** 
(0.02)  (0.04) 
ܹܽ݃݁	ݏ݄݋ܿ݇ሼିଵሽ  0.474***  1.009*** 
(0.06)  (0.09) 
       
 
Notes: Each column reports the estimated impact of variables from separate Logit regressions, where the 
dependent variable = 1 if the individual elected inertia in that period, or 0 = active management. The 
fraction of observations experiencing inertia totaled 57.47% and active management 42.53%. Standard 
errors in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. See 
text.   
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Table 8: Factors Associated with Portfolio Inertia and Delegation (versus Inertia) with a Delegation 
Option: Marginal Effects from Descriptive Multinomial Logit Analysis 
 
A. Reference Group = Active Management 
   Inertia Chosen (vs Active Management)  
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
ܹ݈݁ܽݐ݄ሼିଵሽ  ‐2.499***  ‐2.488*** 
(0.05)  (0.05) 
ܵݐ݋ܿ݇	݉ܽݎ݇݁ݐ	ݏ݄݋ܿ݇ሼିଵሽ  ‐0.218**  ‐0.398*** 
(0.09)  (0.11) 
ܹܽ݃݁	ݏ݄݋ܿ݇ሼିଵሽ  2.654***  1.627*** 
(0.24)  (0.27) 
   Delegation Chosen (vs Active Management)  
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
ܹ݈݁ܽݐ݄ሼିଵሽ  ‐0.743***  ‐0.744*** 
(0.03)  (0.03) 
ܵݐ݋ܿ݇	݉ܽݎ݇݁ݐ	ݏ݄݋ܿ݇ሼିଵሽ  ‐0.242**  ‐0.371*** 
(0.10)  (0.10) 
ܹܽ݃݁	ݏ݄݋ܿ݇ሼିଵሽ  0.929***  0.556** 
(0.24)  (0.25) 
 
 
B. Reference Group = Inertia 
   Delegation Chosen (vs Inertia)  
ܹ݈݁ܽݐ݄ሼିଵሽ  1.756***  1.744*** 
(0.04)  (0.04) 
ܵݐ݋ܿ݇	݉ܽݎ݇݁ݐ	ݏ݄݋ܿ݇ሼିଵሽ  ‐0.024  0.027 
(0.10)  (0.11) 
ܹܽ݃݁	ݏ݄݋ܿ݇ሼିଵሽ  ‐1.725***  ‐1.071*** 
(0.25)  (0.27) 
 
Notes: Each column reports the estimated impact of variables from separate Multinomial Logit 
regressions where the dependent variable: 0 = inertia, 1= active, and 2 = delegation. Individual fixed 
effects are controlled. Observations of active management account for 22.13% of the sample; inertia for 
55.54%; and 22.33% for delegation respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate 
statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. See text.   
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Table 9: Sensitivity Analysis: Change in Portfolio Management Method with No Delegation Option 
(in percentage points) 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
 
Ages Baseline No Learning by doing 
Initial 
Participation 
Cost 
Flat time 
cost 
College 
Graduates 
Inertia 20-35 0.760 0.859 0.774 0.695 0.733
 36-50 0.516 0.662 0.522 0.500 0.464 
 50-65 0.500 0.609 0.507 0.490 0.456 
 65-80 0.444 0.564 0.447 0.396 0.398 
 80+ 0.633 0.712 0.631 0.545 0.608 
Wealth 20-35 0.429 0.242 0.421 0.460 0.453 
 36-50 1.016 0.694 1.004 1.050 1.072 
 50-65 1.326 1.033 1.320 1.353 1.384
 65-80 1.238 1.019 1.237 1.261 1.289 
 80+ 0.793 0.658 0.796 0.862 0.813 
Consumption 20-35 0.227 0.132 0.228 0.225 0.233 
 36-50 0.271 0.191 0.270 0.276 0.284 
 50-65 0.299 0.236 0.298 0.303 0.313 
 65-80 0.219 0.197 0.219 0.220 0.227 
 80+ 0.236 0.213 0.236 0.238 0.241
Labor supply 20-35 0.446 0.246 0.449 0.448 0.462 
 36-50 0.381 0.267 0.381 0.387 0.402
 50-65 0.335 0.258 0.335 0.340 0.359 
Stock holdings 20-35 0.191 0.094 0.181 0.222 0.197
 36-50 0.398 0.225 0.393 0.413 0.424 
 50-65 0.343 0.220 0.342 0.353 0.394 
 65-80 0.261 0.159 0.257 0.269 0.315 
 80+ 0.117 0.075 0.115 0.134 0.134 
Earnings 20-35 0.264 0.153 0.266 0.265 0.274 
 36-50 0.273 0.202 0.274 0.276 0.285 
 50-65 0.276 0.227 0.276 0.279 0.287
 65-80 0.175 0.166 0.175 0.176 0.177 
 80+ 0.177 0.167 0.177 0.178 0.179 
Human capital 20-35 1.080 1.066 1.081 1.081 1.092 
 36-50 1.213 1.154 1.214 1.216 1.232 
 65-80 1.279 1.218 1.280 1.284 1.301 
 80+ 1.279 1.237 1.280 1.285 1.304 
 
Notes: This table shows life cycle patterns of key variables for different model specifications. Column 1 
uses baseline parameters as in Table 1. Columnn 2 shows results when human capital is deterministic over 
the life cycle, without learning by doing. Column 3 shows results when an investor must pay a fixed initial 
stock market participation cost in addition to recurring time cost. Column 4 provides results when the time 
cost of active management is set at 3% for all ages. Column 5 shows results when the endogenous human 
capital process is matched with the wage trend s for of college graduates in the PSID.   
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Table 10: Sensitivity Analysis: Welfare Gains and Change in Portfolio Management Method with a 
Delegation Option (in percentage points) 
 
A. Welfare Gain from a Delegation Option (%) 
 
 Baseline (1) 
No minimum fee 
(2) 
Current industy level  
(3) 
Welfare Gain 1.1897 1.4251 0.9886 
 
 
 
B. Sensitivity Analysis of Portfolio Management Methods (%) 
 
 
 Ages Baseline (1) 
No minimum fee 
(2) 
Current industry level 
(3) 
Delegation 20-35 18.73 33.57 1.84 
36-50 20.45 33.09 5.10 
51-65 20.81 26.78 7.73 
65+ 23.89 31.13 15.54 
Inertia 
 
20-35 73.39 64.38 75.78 
36-50 50.87 49.15 51.77 
51-65 49.30 49.15 50.44 
65+ 54.03 50.32 54.98 
Active 
mgmt 
 
20-35 7.87 2.05 22.37 
36-50 28.68 17.76 43.13 
51-65 29.89 24.07 41.82 
65+ 22.08 18.56 29.49 
 
Note: Panel A presents welfare gain/loss of having a delegation option versus a no-delegation base case, 
for alternative model specifications on minimum fixed delegation fees. Welfare Gain is the percentage 
increase in certainty-equivalent consumption stream compared to the no-delegation (baseline) case. Panel 
B describes the proportion of investors electing each portflio management method under different 
specifications on minimum fixed delegation. Delegation, Inertia,and Active mgmt refer to the proportions 
of investors choosing delegation, inertia, and active management, respectively. Column 1 shows baseline 
results with minimum fee of $2,115 (commensumrate with a minimum balance of $150,000). Column 2 
provides results from having no minimum fee for delegation. Column 3 reports results from imposing a 
minimum fee commensurate with a higher required minimum balance ($243,360), consistent with the 
industry average. 
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Figure 1: Life Cycle Profiles of Consumption, Earnings, Equity Share, Labor Supply, and 
Human Capital with No Delegation Option 
 
A. Earnings, Consumption, and Total Wealth    
 
 
B.  Stock Account Balance   
 
 
C. Labor Supply and Human Capital Accumulation 
 
 
Notes: This Figure shows average life cycle profiles when only active management or inertia are feasible, 
generated from 2,000 independent simulations based on optimal feedback controls from the baseline 
specification of the life cycle model (see Table 1). Panel A displays average consumption, labor income 
and total wealth paths in 2012 US dollars ($1,000s); Panel B shows the average amount of stock account 
balance in 2012 US dollars ($1,000s); and Panel C depicts average work and human capital profiles. 
Human capital is normalized by the initial level.  
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Figure 2: Choice of Portfolio Management Method and Equity Share Over the Life Cycle: 
No Delegation Option  
 
A. Portfolio Management Method over the Life Cycle: No Delegation Option  
 
B. Equity Shares Over the Life Cycle for Portfolio Management Method: No Delegation Option 
 
 
Notes: This figure shows life cycle patterns of portfolio management method and equity shares selected 
with no delegation option. Panel A shows the fraction of investors selecting inertia versus active 
management by age. Panel B shows the life cycle pattern of equity shares depending on whether the 
investor elects inertia or active management. Equity share is defined as stock holdings as a share of 
savings (ܵ௧/ሺܵ௧ ൅ ܤ௧ሻሻ in period ݐ conditional on each portfolio management approach. Averages are 
generated from 2,000 independent simulations for individuals based on optimal feedback controls in the 
baseline specification of the life cycle model. 
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Figure 3: Scatter Plot of Stock Balances Conditional on Portfolio Management Method: No 
Delegation Option 
 
 
 
Notes: This figure shows a scatterplot of stock balances depending on whether the investor elected inertia 
or active management last period. The solid line indicates average stock balances for each portfolio 
management method. Averages generated from 2,000 independent simulations for individuals based on 
optimal feedback controls from the baseline specification. Account balance in 2012 US$ (000). 
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Appendix A: Derivation of Financial Advisor Fees     
To evaluate fees charged by registered investment advisors (RIAs) in the U.S., we have 
tallied information from disclosure documents (Form ADV) filed with the U.S. Securities and 
Commissions (SEC) offic as of July 1, 2014. As is clear from Table A1, the percentage fee of 
total asset under management is the most common fee type used by financial advisors, though 
other charge structures are also found (percentages do not add to 100% as advisors use more than 
one fee structure). 
We also explored who these advisors’ clients were, and we found that most catered to 
individual investors. As we wished to get realistic fees for individual investors, we focused on 
advisors where individual clients comprised most (>three-quarters) of their practice of at least 
100 clients. For our subsanple, the average percentage fee of total assets under management was 
1.410% per year.   
It is also worth noting that, for these advisors, minimum required account balances 
averaged around $240,000. In our model, this threshold for adopting delegation would discourage 
almost all investors. Accordingly, we explore sensitivity to this choice by setting a lower account 
balance for delegation of $150,000 in Section 6. 
 
Table A1: Type of Fees Charged by U.S. Financial Advisors 
Type of Advisory Fee Number (%) of advisers charging fee 
Percentage of asset under management 10,727 (94.7%) 
Fixed fee (other than subscription fee) 4,661 (41.2%) 
Performance-based fee 4,354 (38.5%) 
Hourly charge 3,174 (28.0%) 
Commission 562 (5.0%) 
Subscription fee 128 (1.1%) 
Other  1,623 (14.3%) 
 
Notes: This table presents the fee structure for financial advisory service the US. Source: Calculated by 
authors from the Investment Advisor Public Disclosure (IAPD) Form ADV (part 1) of SEC-registered 
independent advisors as of July 1, 2014. As advisorsmore than one type of fees, we tally all types charged 
(so the columns do not sum to 100%.  
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Appendix B. A Sufficient Condition for an Investor to Elect Portfolio Inertia 
 
Let ሺ݈௧௔,∗, ܵ௧௔,∗, ܥ௧௔,∗ሻ and ൫݈௧௜,∗, ܵ௧௜,∗, ܥ௧௜,∗൯ be maximizers of the objective functions of a 
active management method and a portfolio inertia method, respectively. The following 
implication holds:  
 
Proposition.  For any 	ሺ݈௧௔,∗, ܵ௧௔,∗, ܥ௧௔,∗ሻ  with 	݉ܽݔ൛ห݈௧௔,∗ െ ݈௧௜,∗ห, หܥ௧௔,∗ െ ܥ௧௜,∗หൟ ൏ |ܵ௧௔,∗ െ ܼ௧| ,there 
exists ߜ∗ ൐ 0  such that 	∀ܵ௧௔,∗ with 	|ܵ௧௔,∗ െ ܼ௧| ൏ ߜ∗  implies 
௧ܸ௜ሺܺ௧, ܪ௧, ܼ௧, ݕ௧ሻ ൐ ௧ܸ௔ሺܺ௧, ܪ௧, ܼ௧, ݕ௧ሻ. 
 
Proof: 
We define the excess value of choosing inertia portfolio over active management method as:  
 ෨ܸ௧ሺ݈௧, ܵ௧, ܥ௧; ௧ܹ, ܪ௧, ܼ௧, ݕ௧ሻ ≡ 	 ௧ܸ௜ሺ݈௧, ܵ௧, ܥ௧; 	 ௧ܹ, ܪ௧, ܼ௧, ݕ௧ሻ െ ௧ܸ௔ሺ݈௧, ܵ௧, ܥ௧; 	 ௧ܹ, ܪ௧, ܼ௧, ݕ௧ሻ 
ൌ ௧ܸ௜ሺ݈௧, ܵ௧, ܥ௧; 	 ௧ܹ, ܪ௧, ܼ௧, ݕ௧ሻ െ ሼݑሺܥ௧, 1 െ ݈௧ െ ߶௧ሻ ൅ ݌௧ߚॱ௧ሾ ௧ܸାଵሺ ௧ܹାଵ, ܪ௧ାଵ, ܼ௧ାଵ, ݕ௧ାଵሻሿሽ 
  
For choices variables making inertia superior (݈௧௜,∗, ܵ௧௜,∗, ܥ௧௜,∗) over active management, the excess 
value of choosing inertia becomes  
෨ܸ௧൫݈௧௜,∗, ܵ௧௜,∗, ܥ௧௜,∗; ௧ܹ, ܪ௧, ܼ௧, ݕ௧൯ ൌ ݑ൫ܥ௧௜,∗, 1 െ ݈௧௜,∗൯ െ ݑ൫ܥ௧௜,∗, 1 െ ߶௧ െ ݈௧௜,∗൯ ൐ 0 
 
because the continuation values for inerita and active management method ( ௧ܸାଵሺ⋅ሻ) will be same 
and the utility function u is increasing in leisure time. Since ෨ܸ௧ሺ	⋅; ௧ܹ, ܪ௧, ܼ௧, ݕ௧ሻ  is continuous 
in ሺ݈௧, ܵ௧, ܥ௧ሻ, then ∃ߜ ൐ 0 such that ∀	ሺ݈௧, ܵ௧, ܥ௧ሻ with ݀ൣሺ݈௧, ܵ௧, ܥ௧ሻ, ൫݈௧௜,∗, ܵ௧௜,∗, ܥ௧௜,∗൯൧ ൏ ߜ, we 
have ෨ܸ௧ሺ݈௧, ܵ௧, ܥ௧; ௧ܹ, ܪ௧, ܼ௧, ݕ௧ሻ ൐ 0. Choose ߜ∗ ൌ ටఋଷ . By the assumption that ݉ܽݔ൛ห݈௧௔,∗ െ
݈௧௜,∗ห, หܥ௧௔,∗ െ ܥ௧௜,∗หൟ ൏ |ܵ௧௔,∗ െ ܼ௧|, the condition |ܵ௧௔,∗ െ ܼ௧| ൏ ߜ∗ implies:  
ห݈௧௔,∗ െ ݈௧௜,∗หଶ ൅ |ܵ௧௔,∗ െ ܼ௧|ଶ ൅ หܥ௧௔,∗ െ ܥ௧௜,∗ห ൏ 3ሺߜ∗ሻଶ ൌ ߜ 
 
Plugging in (݈௧௔,∗, ܵ௧௔,∗, ܥ௧௔,∗ሻ into the excess value of choosing inertia, we have the following: 
 
௧ܸ௜ሺ݈௧௔,∗, ܵ௧௔,∗, ܥ௧௔,∗; 	 ௧ܹ , ܪ௧, ܼ௧, ݕ௧ሻെ ሼݑሺܥ௧௔,∗, 1 െ ݈௧௔,∗ െ ߶௧ሻ ൅ ݌௧ߚॱ௧ሾ ௧ܸାଵሺ ௧ܹାଵ, ܪ௧ାଵ, ܼ௧ାଵ, ݕ௧ାଵሿሽ ൐ 0 
 
and the latter part is ௧ܸ௔ሺ	 ௧ܹ, ܪ௧, ܼ௧, ݕ௧ሻ  because ሺ݈௧௔,∗, ܵ௧௔,∗, ܥ௧௔,∗ሻ  is the solution of active 
management method. So we showed ௧ܸ௜ ൐ ௧ܸ௔ for all ܵ௧௔,∗ with |ܵ௧௔,∗ െ ܼ௧| ൏ ߜ∗.  
QED 
 
Discussion: 
If next period’s labor and consumption levels resulting from porfolio active management are very 
similar to those resulting from inertia, there will be a ‘dominant boundary of portfolio inertia’ 
where inertia will be preferred to active management. In other words, if an investor expects he 
will end up choosing a similar consumption/labor supply pair next period, a small change in his 
portfolio will be costly without enhancing his discounted lifetime utility. In such a case, it will 
then be optimal for him not to alter his portfolio. 
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Appendix C. Numerical Solution Procedure35 
 
Here we describe our procedure for obtaining the numerical solution to the investor’s problem. In 
the last period of life T, assuming ்ܸ ାଵ ൌ 0 and ்ܽ ൌ 0 (inertia), the investor maximizes his 
utility by consuming his available liquid assets ( ்ܹ െ ்ܼ) for every pair of state variables ሺ ்ܹ, ܪ், ்ܼ, ݕ்ሻ. In period T−1, we calculate ்ܸ ିଵ௜ , ்ܸ ିଵ௔ , ்ܸ ିଵௗ using their definitions and the 
Monte Carlo integration (based on 50 runs) of ॱ்ିଵሾ்ܸ ሺ ்ܹ, ܪ், ்ܼ, ݕ்ሻሿ , as well as 
Nelder-Mead optimization over ሺ்݈ିଵ, ்ܵିଵ, ்ܿିଵሻ . Of course, ்ܵିଵ ൌ ்ܼିଵ		 in calculating 
்ܸ ିଵ௜ . We approxiate value functions using multi-linear interpolation for state variables not 
contained in the discretized set of grids (see Brandt et al. 2005).  
 
Accordingly, we get ்ܸ ିଵሺ ்ܹିଵ, ܪ்ିଵ, ்ܼିଵ, ݕ்ିଵሻ ൌ max 	൛்ܸ ିଵ௜ , ்ܸ ିଵ௔ , ்ܸ ିଵௗ ൟ . When 
்ܸ ିଵ௜ ൌ max 	൛்ܸ ିଵ௜ , ்ܸ ିଵ௔ , ்ܸ ିଵௗ ൟ, portfolio inertia is optimal. Different choices of		management 
method are derived similarly. Iterating these steps until the first period, we get the value 
functions ሼ ௧ܸሽ௧ୀଵ்  which completely characterize the solution to the investor’s problem. Last, we 
generate 2,000 sample paths for individual investors using variations of the wage shock and 
uncertain stock market returns 
 
For multi-linear interpolation, we extend a one-variable linear interpolation to a multivariable 
setting. Given a current state ( ௧ܹ , ܪ௧, ܼ௧, ݕ௧	 ), the next period’s realized state  
( ෩ܹ௧ାଵ, ܪ෩௧ାଵ, ෨ܼ௧ାଵ, ݕ෤௧ାଵ	) is determined by the current period’s choices (portfolio management 
method: ܽ௧ , labor supply: l୲ , equity investment amount: S୲ , and consumption: C୲ ) and 
exogenous shocks (stock return: ෨ܴ୲, shock to human capital: λ୲ and persistent/transitory wage 
shock). It is possible that the realized state variable set ( ෩ܹ௧ାଵ, ܪ෩௧ାଵ, ෨ܼ௧ାଵ, ݕ෤௧ାଵ	) does not belong 
to a set of discretized state variables ൛ ௧ܹାଵ௜ , ܪ௧ାଵ௝ , ܼ௧ାଵ௞ , ݕ௧ାଵ௟ ൟ௜,௝,௞,௟ in the next period. To address 
this issue, we find adjacent two state variables for each realized state variable.  For example, for 
a potential wealth level ( ෩ܹ௧ାଵ) in the next period, we find nearest two grid points, ௧ܹାଵଵ and 
௧ܹାଵଶ  among discretized wealth grids ሼ ௧ܹାଵሽ such that ௧ܹାଵଵ ൑ ෩ܹ௧ାଵ ൑ ௧ܹାଵଶ . For a realized 
set of state variables ( ෩ܹ௧ାଵ, ܪ෩௧ାଵ, ෨ܼ௧ାଵ, ݕ෤௧ାଵ	), there will be 16 sets of close state variables 
൛ሼ ௧ܹାଵଵ , ௧ܹାଵଶ ሽ, ሼܪ௧ାଵଵ , ܪ௧ାଵଶ ሽ, ሼܼ௧ାଵଵ , ܼ௧ାଵଶ ሽ, ሼݕ௧ାଵଵ , ݕ௧ାଵଶ ሽൟ for which we know the value of value 
functions ሼ ௧ܸାଵሺ ௧ܹାଵଵ , ܪ௧ାଵଵ , ܼ௧ାଵଵ , ݕ௧ାଵଵ ሻ, … , ௧ܸାଵሺ ௧ܹାଵଶ , ܪ௧ାଵଶ , ܼ௧ାଵଶ , ݕ௧ାଵଶ ሻሽ  by preceding 
backward value function iterations.  
 
The value of V୲ାଵሺ ෩ܹ௧ାଵ, ܪ෩௧ାଵ, ෨ܼ௧ାଵ, ݕ෤௧ାଵ	ሻ will be determined by a weighted sum of value 
functions of nearest state variables. We use the inverse of distance between realized state 
variables and each set of close state variables as a weight for the corresponding value function. 
Denote D௜,௝,௞,௟ as the distance from ሺ ෩ܹ௧ାଵ, ܪ෩௧ାଵ, ෨ܼ௧ାଵ, ݕ෤௧ାଵ	ሻ  to ൛ ௧ܹାଵ௜ , ܪ௧ାଵ௝ , ܼ௧ାଵ௞ , ݕ௧ାଵ௟ ൟ  , 
which is defined as the ordinary Euclidean distance: 
D௜,௝,௞,௟ ൌ ට൫ ෩ܹ௧ାଵ െ ௧ܹାଵ௜ ൯ଶ ൅ ൫ܪ෩௧ାଵ െ ܪ௧ାଵ௝ ൯
ଶ ൅ ൫ ෨ܼ௧ାଵ െ ܼ௧ାଵ௞ ൯ଶ ൅ ൫ݕ෤௧ାଵ െ ݕ௧ାଵ௟ ൯ଶ.  
 
The corresponding weight (݃௜,௝,௞,௟) is constructed as  
                                                     
35 This numerical procedure is implemented with FORTRAN90 and the GNU Gfortran compiler.  
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݃௜,௝,௞,௟ ≡
1
D௜,௝,௞,௟
∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ 1D௜,௝,௞,௟
ଶ௟ୀଵଶ௞ୀଵଶ௝ୀଵଶ௜ୀଵ
 
 
Thus, the further distant the nearby state variables are from the realized state, the less weight will 
be assigned to its value function. And of course, the sum of weights is equal to one by 
construction (∑݃௜,௝,௞,௟ ൌ 1). 
 
The value of V୲ାଵሺ ෩ܹ௧ାଵ, ܪ෩௧ାଵ, ෨ܼ௧ାଵ, ݕ෤௧ାଵሻ is estimated as a weighted sum of adjacent 
value functions: 
V୲ାଵሺ ෩ܹ௧ାଵ, ܪ෩௧ାଵ, ෨ܼ௧ାଵ, ݕ෤௧ାଵሻ ൌ෍ ෍ ෍ ෍ ݃௜,௝,௞,௟ ௧ܸାଵሺ ௧ܹାଵ௜ , ܪ௧ାଵ௝ , ܼ௧ାଵ௞ , ݕ௧ାଵ௟ ሻ
ଶ
௟ୀଵ
ଶ
௞ୀଵ
ଶ
௝ୀଵ
ଶ
௜ୀଵ
 
 
The above interpolation method is implemented both in VFI and simulations finding the 
maximized future continuous values and corresponding maximal choice variables (i.e., portfolio 
management method, labor supply, equity investment, consumption). In the course of 
implementation, we impose a restriction that the equity balance cannot exceed total wealth 
( ௧ܹାଵ௜ ൒ ܼ௧ାଵ௞ 	).  
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Appendix D.  Calibrating the Learning by Doing Mechanism  
 
This Appendix explains how we calibrate the parameters in the learning by doing mechanism. 
We first estimated the parameters by matching wage profiles generated by a learning by doing 
mechanism with the conventional wage profile in the life cycle portfolio choice literature (e.g., 
Gomes and Michaelides 2005; Cocco et al. 2005). To be precise, we generated 3,000 life cycle 
wage paths based on age-dependent wage trend for male high school graduates, assuming an 
idiosyncratic wage shock and a permanent wage shock with the parameters reported in Hubener 
et al. (2013). We also generate 3,000 life cycle paths of wages based on our learning by doing 
mechanism (formula (2)), allowing varying levels of skill formation uncertainty (λ), the 
depreciation rate for human capital, learning efficiency (a), returns to scale (θ), and idiosyncratic 
and permanent wage shocks with an assumed level of average labor supply level (0.35).  
 
For each potential candidate set of parameters, we calculated moment conditions by year of age 
including average and standard deviation of wages, skewness and kurtosis of mean wages, and 
maximum and minimum average wages. Then we estimated these parameters by minimizing the 
numerical distance between moment conditions generated by learning by doing mechanism with 
labor market shocks and moment conditions generated by the conventional wage profile as in 
Hubener et al. (2013). An illustration of the match is presented below. 
 
Figure A1: A normalized wage profile matched with the empirical wage profile  
 
Note: This figure shows patterns of average wage profiles generated by the human capital accumulation 
process with labor market shocks (dotted line) and the empirical data from the PSID (solid line). The wage 
path is normalized by the first year’s wage.  
 
